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Abstract 
February 24, 2011 
Pierre Poster Session   
YENL ING CHANG;  DAN A .  TAL LEY  
The Impact of the Minimum Leverage Ratio on  
South Dakota Community Banks 
There has apparently been a significant paradigm shift regarding community 
bank risk management, at least from the viewpoint of recent legislation. As it 
is titled, the new act is to promote economic growth, provide tailored regula-
tory relief and enhance customer protection. One wonders whether the 
soundness of the U.S. system of smaller banks will be compromised. The 
purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of the new policy chang-
es effective 2014 on the asset and liability portfolios of community banks. 
We begin our research program by examining community banks in South 
Dakota. The results of stochastic cost frontier model on South Dakota com-
munity banks show that South Dakota community banks improve operation 
efficiency after receiving relief on capital constraint.   
Methodology 
Results and Discussion 
Background 
Since the Financial Reform Act of 2010 was enacted, U.S. community banks 
have been concerned about the cost of complying with the more restrictive 
CAMELS (Capital adequacy, Asset, Management, Earnings, Liquidity,  
Sensitivity) standards and how those costs will impact their ability to  
compete with larger U.S. banks. Community banks argue that their mission 
is to foster local economic growth and develop a deeper banking relationship 
with the local community. Because of the business models under which they 
operate, community banks have limited access to external equity funding in 
the capital markets. Community banks rely largely on core deposits to make 
loans to their customers. As a result, community banks have pleaded with 
lawmakers and Federal banking agencies to work on rulemaking to help  
address these compliance cost issues.  
As directed by the new Policy Statement signed by President Obama, the 
Fed formally adopted these revisions on April 9, 2015. The new rules  
allowed BHCs and SLHCs with consolidated assets of less than $10 billion 
to be exempt from the FRB’s risk-based capital and leverage rules, and  
therefore to be exempt from complying with the Basel III banking  
regulations. 
Liu and Cortets (2015), Coccorese (2014), Berger and Mester 
(1997), and Mester (1996) employ variations of Stochastic 
Frontier analysis to analyze the operating efficiency of financial 
institutions.  We then propose to follow this stream of research 
and adopt the concepts of Stochastic Frontier Analysis  
originally developed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and 
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) to build a Stochastic Cost 
Frontier models in estimating the cost efficiency of financial  
institutions prior to and after the relief of a capital constraint.  
Stochastic Cost Frontier Model 
   Model 1: ln Ci = f(Xi; B) + Ui +Vi, i=1……...N,   
Wherein C is observed cost of banks, X is a vector of bank-
specific variables including banks on-balance-sheet assets, off-
balance-sheet assets, capital ratio, leverage ratio and other  
controlled variables, B is a vector of parameters. f(X,B)  is  
predicted log cost given a vector of X .  U is one side-error term 
representing cost inefficiency, which is calculated by the  
difference between the predicted cost value from its frontier.   
V is a two-sided error term representing statistical ‘white noise’ 
that is independent of U. N is the number of community banks  
in the sample.  The variable U is of particular interest as it 
measures the degree of bank inefficiency captured by the model. 
The results of the stochastic cost 
frontier model are presented in  
Table 1. This study researches all 
the community banks in South  
Dakota. The average size of  
community banks in South Dakota 
is 7 million dollars in terms of total 
assets. The average number of  
community banks in South Dakota 
during the period of empirical study 
is 77. We collect 2,525 quarterly  
data points from 2010 quarter 1 through 2018 quarter 3 from the  
Federal government FIEC database. Table 1 shows that community 
banks in South Dakota experience production inefficiency prior to and 
after the capital constraint relief, indicating banks have operated  
below its optimal cost efficiency level. A striking, yet not too  
surprising result is that banks in South Dakota improve production  
efficiency after the relief from the capital constraint as the inefficiency 
measure (mu) decreases to 0.244 from 0.440.  
Conclusions 
Our findings shed light on banking policy and allow the regulators to    
evaluate the impact of the new policy on community banks. It is  
evident that smaller community banks need to operate more flexibly 
to maximize operational efficiency. According to our estimates, South 
Dakota community banks could save as much as $200 million each 
quarter. Bank regulators should take this into account and create a fair  
environment for both small and large sized banks. 
Literature Review 
Dahl, Meyer, and Neely (2016) document the relationship between compli-
ance costs and bank performance using bank survey data. The bank survey 
data emphasizes financial institutions with total assets less than $10 billion.  
Compliance expenses were collected from these smaller financial  
institutions.  This research indicates that a higher compliance cost is not  
necessarily associated with higher performance in terms of CAMELS  
ratings.  This result therefore supports recent policy proposals to reduce  
burdensome regulations on smaller banks.  
Chang and Talley (2017) examines US bank risk taking behavior by  
analyzing changes on on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet activities. They 
conclude that larger banks are likely to engage in riskier on-balance-sheet 
and off-balance-sheet investments for higher returns. This research also  
supports policy proposals to relieve the regulatory burden on smaller banks.  
Deyoung, Distinguin, and Tarazi (2018) analyzes the liquidity behavior of 
commercial banks of different sizes in response to negative capital shocks. 
They use data from pre-Basel III period, when regulation constrained bank 
equity capital decisions but did not similarly constrain liquidity positions. 
Their finding shows that smaller-sized banks treat liquidity and capital as 
substitutes. As a result, this study also provides additional support for the 
policy proposals to exempt community banks from the stricter liquidity  
ratios imposed by Basel III.     
time period prior 
to the relief of 
capital constraint
time period after  the 
relief of capital 
constraint
Dependent variable: Efficency ratio 
Independent variables :
constant 0.021 -0.110
Agricullture Loan -0.176 0.279***
Commercial and Industrial Loan -0.238 0.345***
Loan secured by Real Estate -0.222 0.262***
Consumer Loan -0.415 0.266***
Allowance for loan and lease losses 3.599*** -2.103***
Core deposit 0.321** 0.286***
Leverage coverage ratio 0.520 -0.651**
total capital ratio 0.189 0.464***
ineffciency measures (mu) 0.440*** 0.243***
/lnsigma2 -3.659*** -4.068***
/ilgtgamma 2.207*** 1.461***
sigma2 0.026 0.017
gamma 0.901 0.812
sigma_u2 0.023 0.014
sigma_v2 0.003 0.003
Table 1 : Bank Production Efficiency prior to and after the relief of capital 
constraint for community banks
